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Untenured Professors' Rights to Reappointment
Arthur H. Kahn* and Michael D. Solomon**
N A RECENT EDITORIAL entitled "Threat to Campus Freedom," the
New York Times stated: 1
The national mood of economic frustration and anti-intellectual re-
action has begun to feed a growing movement against academic
tenure. The arguments marshalled for abolishing professional job
security are cloaked in high-minded rhetoric of academic reform.
This is a transparent disguise of the economic and political anger
which provides the true motivation.
It would be naive to pretend that the two-front threat to academic
freedom today constitutes less of a clear and present danger [than
the 'know-nothing onslaught in the 1950's']. That danger places a
special burden on the academic leadership to tighten its own safe-
guards against abuses of tenure. But such reforms must be carried
forward with a firm resolve not to surrender the essential pro-
tection of those freedoms without which the universities would
soon become the pawn of powerful and unscrupulous forces.
Thus, we are now in a period during which present tenure systems are
undergoing close scrutiny by the public and the legislatures. Some of
those now criticizing universities would like to see these institutions of
higher learning placed under greater accountability to the public. It is
especially during this period that university boards and administra-
tors must exercise extreme care to eliminate abuses of tenure and pre-
vent any new abuses from occurring, in order to avoid unnecessary
criticism from those who wish to embarrass the supporters of that aca-
demic freedom under which our universities have flourished.
To further complicate this controversy on the retention of academic
tenure, a new movement has arisen in universities supported by public
funds, for tenure rights to be granted to non-tenured faculty, thus nulli-
fying the distinction between tenured and non-tenured personnel. By
tenure we mean the right not to be dismissed except for cause. This
trend for the obliteration of the distinction has recently received some
support from the courts in this country. The proponents of this trend
argue that upon his being given notification of non-reappointment, the
non-tenured professor ought to be given reasons therefor and also a
subsequent hearing upon request for a hearing on the reasons. The non-
tenured professors are thus asking that they be treated differently from
other professionals, skilled laborers, secretaries, custodial workers and
others who also may have one year contracts with governmental
agencies and whose contracts may be not renewed at the discretion of
their employers. In this article, we will examine whether the due
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process provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States entitle a non-tenured professor, who has been ap-
pointed for a single academic year, to a statement of reasons justifying
his non-reappointment and a hearing thereon where no substantive con-
stitutional issue is involved.
Due Process and the Non-Tenured Professor
The source of the constitutional rights, substantive and procedural,
of a professor to renewal of his contract, even where the principal con-
tract contains no provisions for renewal, lies in the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution, which states that "No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. .... ,, 2 It is now
widely recognized in the courts that a teacher may not be dismissed or
denied reappointment or rehiring for constitutionally impermissible
reasons such as those based on prejudice against a race, religion, na-
tional origin or the assertion of rights guaranteed by law.3 This applies
to a teacher without tenure or an expectancy of reemployment. 4 In
Pickering v. Board of Education,5 the Supreme Court stated that:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be
read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy
as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection
with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it pro-
ceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous
prior decisions of this Court.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,6 the Supreme Court reviewed
its decision in Adler v. Board of Education 7 which had stated that
teachers "may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms
laid down by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose
to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and as-
sociations and go elsewhere." 8 In Keyishian, Justice Brennan writing
for the court, stated that the constitutional doctrine which had emerged
since Adler, had rejected its major premise that "public employment,
including academic employment, may be conditioned upon the sur-
2 U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551
(1956); Ferguson v. Thomas, 403 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970); Fred v. Board of Public
Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th
Cir. 1968); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1003 (1967); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2nd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825
(1947); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Lucia v. Dug-
gan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
4 Ferguson v. Thomas, 403 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1970).
5 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
6 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
7 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
s Id. at 492.
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/10
render of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct
government action." 9
Despite these repeated assertions by the Supreme Court on the
issue of a teacher's constitutional rights, apparently at least two federal
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court of Illinois have dismissed cases
where teachers claimed that their contracts had not been renewed be-
cause of their exercise of rights protected by the first amendment.' 0 The
Illinois Fooden case places the burden of proof on the complaining pro-
fessor.
With few exceptions, it is now apparent that professors who believe
they have been denied reappointment or contract renewal in violation
of their substantive constitutional rights have a readily available
remedy to demand, in the form of mandamus, the renewal of the con-
tract, or to maintain an action for damages or other such actions as may
be appropriate in the various states.1' Despite these judicial remedies
which guard against violation of a non-tenured professor's substantive
constitutional rights, some professors are nevertheless intensifying their
demand that a statement of reasons whether bottomed on substantive
constitutional grounds or not, and a hearing thereon, be provided to
any teacher denied reappointment. In the spring of 1971 The American
Association of University Professors adopted the view (in general terms)
that reasons for non-renewal ought to be given to a probationary teacher,
and that he be entitled to demand and get a formal hearing thereafter if
he allege some cause. The thrust for "reasons" is probably attributable
to the general trend towards unionization of faculties. This movement for
''reasons" recently received encouragement from a United States District
Court decision in Wisconsin, now stayed pending appeal. Roth v. Board
9 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
10 Parker v. Board of Education, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965). This case, which
notably was decided prior to the recent decisions in Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), refused
to consider allegations of "termination" based upon violation of constitutional rights
on the ground that according to the contract involved, the Board had a right not to
renew upon proper notification. In Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970), a teacher at Southern Colorado State College was
not reappointed following the completion of his second year of service. It is unclear
whether the court based its decision on a finding that the appellant failed to state
sufficient facts alleging a denial of his first amendment right to free speech or
whether the court decided that the board of trustees had non-reviewable discretion
in not reappointing the appellant under COLORADO REv. STATS., §§ 124-17-1 and 124-5-1
(1963) and therefore Jones had no right which could be infringed. Two judges dis-
sented, citing Supreme Court decisions and stating that upon an allegation of in-
fringement of constitutional rights, a trial of the issues was in order. Fooden v.
Board of Governors, 268 N.E.2d 15 (Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 25, 1971) cited Jones, supra, as
authority in denying a similar action.
11 See Freedman, The Legal Rights of Untenured Teachers, 1 NOLPE ScHooL L. J. 93
(1970) for a summary of the cases and types of actions brought by non-tenured
teachers under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. In Fallon v. Board of Higher Education, 14 Misc. 2d
9 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1958), aff'd 192 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1959) the supreme court
was confronted with a political science instructor who was not reappointed. In deny-
ing the instructor's application for reappointment, the court stated:
The law is not merely a composition of cold type; it is a living organism which
moulds itself to meet the needs of an ever changing civilization and if there were
any claim in this case by Dr. Fallon that he was the victim of racial or religious
discrimination, this court, if such a claim were substantiated, would not hesitate
to find a remedy to meet the situation. Fallon, supra at 13.
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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of Regents,12 involved an instructor who was not reappointed for a second
year. Although the teacher alleged he was not reappointed for reasons
involving his expression of criticisms of the university, the issue of
whether he was not rehired in violation of his constitutional right to
free speech was not involved in the court's decision. Judge Doyle issued
a decision stating that irrespective of whether a teacher's employment
is terminated during a contractual period, or he is not renewed for a
subsequent period:
I hold that minimal procedural due process includes a statement
of the reasons why the university intends not to retain the professor,
a notice of hearing at which he may respond to the stated reasons,
and a hearing if the professor appears at the appointed time and
place. At such hearing, the professor must have a reasonable op-
portunity to submit evidence relevant to the stated reasons. The
burden of going forward and the burden of proof rests with the
professor. Only if he makes a reasonable showing that the stated
reasons are wholly inappropriate as a basis for decision or that
they are wholly without basis in fact would the university adminis-
tration become obliged to show that the stated reasons are not in-
appropriate or that they have a basis in fact. 13
Thus, the Roth case mandated that a university provide a statement of
reasons and a hearing thereon upon the non-reappointment of a non-ten-
ured teacher, irrespective of whether those reasons are constitutionally
impermissible. Under Roth, a non-tenured teacher is equally entitled to
reasons and a hearing whether he was not rehired on account of race,
exercise of free speech, incompetent teaching, insubordination or exces-
sive absence.
The Roth decision failed to realize the impact of the Supreme Court
decision in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy14
which specifically states that:
The Court has consistently recognized that an interest closely
analogous to . . . the interest of a government employee in retaining
his job, can be summarily denied. It has become a settled principle
that government employment in the absence of legislation can be
revoked at the will of the appointing officer.
Judge Doyle, in the Roth decision, stated that:
In the present case, I consider myself bound by Cafeteria Workers
v. McElroy to undertake the balancing test described there: that is,
to determine the precise nature of the government function involved
as well as of the private interest that has been affected by govern-
ment action.15
12 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wisc. 1970); and see below, n. 31, as to the appeal in the
7th Circuit.
13 Id. at 980.
14 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961). In this case, a short order cook, working on a military
installation was required to turn in her identification badge because she had failed
to meet the security requirements of the installation. Without this badge, she could
not continue in the employment of the concessionaire on the base. Thus, she was
denied her right to be employed on the military base by government action.
15 310 F. Supp. 972, 977 (W.D. Wisc. 1970).
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Judge Doyle believed that this balancing test was to be applied to
each type of government employment to decide which positions were
entitled to hearings and which were not. The Wisconsin Federal Dis-
trict Court then decided that the interests of a non-tenured member of
the instructional staff of a university were greater than those of a short
order cook on a military base (the interest involved in the Cafeteria
Workers decision).
A careful reading, however, of Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, reveals that the balancing test was applied in that
case to the situation of all government employees and that the Supreme
Court found that a hearing was not required. Thus, the Supreme Court
stated:
... the government function operating here was not the power to
regulate or license, as lawmaker, an entire trade or profession, or
to control an entire branch of private business, but, rather, as
proprietor, . . . [t]his case ...involves the Federal Government's
dispatch of its own internal affairs.", . ..
Admittedly, if a person is denied a license to teach, his personal in-
terest in being entitled to a statement of reasons and a hearing would
be greater than the government interest. The interest which we are dis-
cussing in this article, however, is solely that of teaching at one college
and is certainly no greater than that of the average government em-
ployee. While a teacher may be questioned by a subsequent prospective
employer as to the reasons for his leaving a previous position, an en-
gineer, law enforcement officer, secretary, and even a custodial worker
is likely to encounter the same inquiries. In any type of employment
such inquiries may lead to the obtaining of a poor reference from a
previous employer which may be a factor in denying an application for
employment. A person denied reappointment from one college cannot,
in good faith, assert that he is thereby banned from the profession.
If a teacher does not continue in the employment of one college for an
indefinite number of years, he is not necessarily undesirable.
Effect of Litigation on the Roth Standards
Although the issue involved here has been litigated numerous times
in the past, with the result that courts invaribly have decided that non-
tenured teachers are not entitled to a statement of reasons and a
hearing,17 the past few years have seen a great increase of activity in
16 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961).
17 There are numerous New York State decisions which have held that the public
employer need not give reasons nor a hearing for not appointing or reappointing a
teacher. See Block v. Tead, 179 Misc. 554 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1943); Pinto v. Wynstra,
255 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1964); Butler v. Allen, 29 App. Div. 2d 799 (3rd Dept. 1968);
Fallon v. Board of Higher Education, 14 Misc. 2d 9 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1958),
aff'd 192 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1959); Schaflander v. Brooklyn College, in 158 N.Y.L.J., July
12, 1967 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1967). In the latter case, involving a sociology in-
structor, the court stated:
When petitioner speaks of "notice and hearings," obviously he is confused with
the rights of an appointee with tenure. Petitioner has no tenure, nor does he
make any claims to tenure; hence the board is not required to give any reasons
for its failure to reappoint him.
(Continued on next page)
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the courts on this issue. While the Roth decision has received much
publicity and serves to inspire faculty groups to continue their litiga-
tion on the issue, it has received little support in the courts.' s Most de-
cisions continue to completely deny any inherent right to demand reasons
and a hearing thereon, 19 but two decisions have produced novel results.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sinderman v. Perry,20 ruled
that under all circumstances, except one, a non-tenured teacher would
not be entitled to a hearing upon non-reappointment. The exception
contemplated by the court is that when a teacher believes non-renewal
of his contract is based either on his exercise of constitutionally guar-
anteed rights or constitutes some other actionable wrong. In this sit-
uation he should so inform the institution with reasonable promptness
and in sufficient detail to better enable the college to expose any errors
which may exist in the claim. In such a case, the institution would then
constitute a tribunal which possessed the qualities of academic expertise
and impartiality to the charges to conduct a hearing. In justifying this
policy, the court stated that: "[s]chool-constituted review bodies are the
most appropriate forums for initially determining issues of this type,
(Continued from preceding page)
There are also numerous decisions by the New York State Commissioner of Educa-
tion on this issue. In Lorch v. Board of Higher Education, 71 N.Y. State Dept. Rep.
152, 153 (1950), the Commissioner stated:
No reasons were given for the failure of respondent Board of Higher Education
to reappoint him, nor does the law require that such reasons be given. No pro-
vision requiring such action appears in the Education Law. There is no require-
ment of such law, furthermore; which imposes a duty to reappoint, nor is it
necessary that a failure to reappoint must be based on charges, hearings, or any
other specified procedure.
See also Swadesh v. Board of Higher Education, 71 N.Y. State Dept. Rep. 154 (1950);
Matter of James, 10 Ed. Dept..Rep. , N.Y. Comm. Decision No. 8195 (1970). A
recent Massachusetts decision, DeCanio v. School Committee of Boston, 260 N.E.2d
676, 680 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1971) stated: "Most of the cases in which the question
has been considered have concluded, that in the absence of a statute to the contrary,
a probationary teacher may be dismissed without a hearing." A long list of cases is
thereafter cited.
Is Gouge v. Joint School District No. 1, 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wisc. 1970) was
also decided by Judge Doyle. Orr v. Trinter, 318 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio, 1970)
involving a high school teacher not reappointed for a second year, adopted the
conclusion of the Roth case. In Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969), a
public school teacher was dismissed during his contract term on account of wearing
a beard. The case, decided on a constitutional, rather than a contractual basis,
stated that the teacher's right to wear a beard in combination with his professional
reputation entitled him to a statement of reasons and a due process hearing prior
to being dismissed. The scope of the decision was not made clear and the teacher's
right to a hearing may have been primarily based on a constitutional right to wear
a beard as a means of expression.
19 See Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, March 23, 1970;
Fooden v. Board of Governors, 268 N.E.2d 15 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 1971); see note 10,
supra, for a discussion of these two cases. Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist.,
405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969), a decision concurred
in by Justice Blackmun involved the non-reappointment of six black public school
teachers in Arkansas. Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1969) will be dis-
cussed later in the text. Thaw v. Board of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 98 (1970)
involved a public school teacher who alleged no violation of his constitutional rights
as to the cause of his termination. DeCanio v. School Comm. of Boston, 260 N.E.2d
676 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., 1970) involved the dismissal of six public school teachers
in Boston. The decision stated: "We are unsure of the precise constitutional basis
for the holding of the District Court in the Lucia case. Nor are we persuaded by the
reasoning of the court in the Roth and Gouge cases." 260 N.E.2d 676, 681.
20 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970).
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both for the convenience of the parties and in order to bring academic
expertise to bear. ... 21
In the Sinderman case, the court was well intentioned in attempting
to resolve a troublesome problem, but the issue should have been left to
the legislature. The legislature had determined that the courts should be
the first mandatory review panel for the hearing of claims of denial of
substantive constitutional rights. If the legislature wishes an academic
board to be the initial tribunal, it has the statutory power to enact appro-
priate laws to that effect. The legislature might consider the court's justi-
fications for such a tribunal to be nullified by other policy considerations.
The court noted that an academic panel would be convenient for the
parties, but such a panel may also encourage frivolous and numerous
claims. Every teacher who feels he has been slighted may decide to
allege that his constitutional rights have been violated when all he has
to do to start the process is to submit a letter making a bare allegation.
Whether an academic panel or a court is better equipped to hear a
teacher's claim of persecution is a question of judgment, and a legisla-
ture may well decide that a court is more expert in determining if con-
stitutional freedoms have been violated. It is questionable whether it
is beneficial for a court to decide constitutional questions on review from
an academic panel. The substantial evidence doctrine may well prevent
the court in a review situation from dispensing justice in an area which
merits the full participation of men fully trained in law. Whether such
an academic panel will decrease the number of cases which end up in
the courts is doubtful since usually only one fully convinced of his
rights will bring an action. Such a person is unlikely to be deterred by
the decision of an academic panel especially since unions, the presence
of which are being increasingly felt amongst faculties, encourage litiga-
tion to the final step. The aggrieved person is unlikely to be convinced
of the impartiality of an academic panel which in some manner owes its
jurisdiction to the college administrators who appoint them.
In addition to the Sinderman case, we must discuss the decision of
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Drown v. Portsmouth School
District.2 2 In the Drown case, the court recognized the cases we have
already discussed here and decided that in determining what procedures
are required where a non-tenured teacher is not reappointed, one must
balance the competing interests of the individual teacher and of the
school board. Although this is the same line of reasoning the Roth case
used, a line which we have previously indicated may not be correct if
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy2 3 is followed, the
Drown court reached a result different from Roth. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals decided that while due process requires a statement of
reasons, a hearing thereafter is not required.
21 Id. at 944.
22 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970).
23 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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Policy Considerations
In the remainder of this article, we will discuss the policy argu-
ments on both sides of the issue of whether "reasons" need be given
for the non-renewal of a contract of a non-tenured professor. If the
balancing test is eventually adopted as the rule to be applied with re-
spect to this issue, it is our belief that the integrity of the academic
institution and the faculty in maintaining a policy of not giving "reasons"
and a hearing are much greater than those of the non-tenured in-
dividual teacher in obtaining the "reasons."
A statement adopted by the Board of Higher Education of the City
of New York in December of 1967 explains its policy for not giving
reasons or a hearing to the non-reappointed non-tenured teacher or even
the non-appointed applicant. 24 The reasons given by the Board for not
24 "No Presumptions. At every step in the appointment and reappointment pro-
cedure, it should be made clear to the candidate and to all concerned that, until the
candidate gains tenure under the provisions of the statute and the bylaws of the
Board, each appointment is for one year, there is no presumption of reappointment,
and no reasons for non-reappointment need be given. This fact should be com-
municated, in academic rather than in legalistic language, in the original and sub-
sequent letters of appointment or reappointment, and in all conversations held with
the candidate, both by department members and chairmen, and by officers of the
college outside the department. The temptation to attract promising candidates to
the college by implications of the virtual certainty of a permanent position must be
sternly resisted, unless and until the tenure law is revised to provide, as many
universities do, for permissive initial tenure appointments at certain ranks....
The recommendation that no reasons should ever be given for the action of a
committee in voting not to recommend appointment or promotion of a candidate
is a recommendation which was arrived at after a rather careful consideration of the
pros and cons.
On the side of giving reasons, the most potent argument arises from a sense of
fair play: if a person has tried his best to make good in a position, it seems in accord
with our American traditions that he should be told wherein he failed and be given
an opportunity to rebut, explain or otherwise appeal. Furthermore, the need to
support a non-reappointment by the citation of definite reasons might be conceived
of as a barrier to the forces of malice and prejudice, whether personal or ethnic.
On the other side, the necessity to give reasons for non-reappointment, with the
consequent receipt of rebuttals, explanations and submission of contrary expert
opinion, places the college and its P & B [personnel & budget] committees in the
position of defendant rather than of judge. College officials would soon find their
time, energies and talents dissipated in disputes. Academic excellence could not
thrive in that atmosphere and a premium would be placed on peaceful mediocrity.
Often the reasons have nothing to do with the candidate himself (he may indeed
be satisfactory), but rather with the possibility that better candidates, with wider
backgrounds, more versatility, or specialties which are more likely to be of use
to the department in the years to come, may be available, and the department does
not desire to foreclose the opportunity to attract such candidates. More importantly,
any requirement that reasons be given for non-appointment would have the effect
of instituting a type of presumptive tenure inimical to the conduct of the colleges
as institutions of higher learning. It is sufficient that reasons or cause must be
proven to terminate the services of a tenured person. If it is not too paternalistic
in tone, still another argument against the giving of reasons for non-reappointment
may be urged: it is really not in the best interest of the candidate himself, for it
makes a matter of record a negative evaluation which may come back to plague him
later.
On balance, we have decided to recommend against ever assigning reasons for
non-reappointment or non-promotion. We likewise believe that it would be pro-
fessional misconduct for a member of a P & B committee to disclose the substance
or even the nature of the discussion at the P & B meeting. As far as the actions of a
Department and/or its committees in respect to a candidate are concerned, only the
president of the college or his designee should be empowered to discuss these actions
with a candidate."-Board of Higher Education Minutes, December 18, 1967, Cal. No.
3 (b) pp. 599-601. It must be realized that if the Roth case is affirmed and gains
widespread recognition in other courts, its policy will probably be extended to the
disappointed applicant.
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granting a statement of reasons and a hearing were: (1) The assigning
of reasons with the subsequent receipt of rebuttals and opposing opinions
would place the college official in the position of defendant rather than
judge with the result that mediocrity would be accepted; (2) the amount
of time which would have to be expended on this process would prevent
officials from taking care of other responsibilities (the number of ap-
plicants and nominees for reappointment is enormous); (3) the reason
for rejection is often that the college wishes to keep open the oppor-
tunity to obtain a person more suited to the job, or in the case of re-
appointment leading to tenure, of not foreclosing for a substantial period
of time the possibility of employing a person of much greater value to
the college or of changing the nature of the college's offerings; (4) as-
signing reasons would have the effect of "presumptive tenure," some-
thing not conducive to the operation of a university and (5) it is in the
interest of most applicants not to have a negative evaluation on record.
The Sinderman case summed up the first four arguments above by
stating that a policy of giving rseaons and a hearing "would have the
legal effect of improperly denying to colleges freedom of contract to
employ personnel on a probationary basis or under annual contracts
which are unfettered by any reemployment obligation." 25 A result of
having to give reasons and a hearing would be that college officials
would become increasingly reluctant not to reappoint someone for fear
of becoming involved in time-consuming and arduous procedures in de-
fense of their positions, eventually reducing colleges to the level of
mediocrity. 26 If the Roth position were adopted "we would have little
need of tenure or merit laws as there could be only . . . a discharge for
cause, with the school board carrying the burden of showing that the
discharge was for a permissible reason." 27 In sum, the procedure
outlined in the Roth case would "nullify" the probationary system 28 and
the practice of one year contracts. It would give all teachers "tenure"
immediately upon initial appointment.
In deciding that a non-tenured teacher was entitled to a statement
of reasons and a hearing upon non-reappointment, the Roth court 29 was
influenced by the unfairness apparent in a procedure which allows a
25 Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 1970).
26 This result is already occurring in the New York City public school system where
these rights have been gained by the teacher's union which has gone out on long
strikes a number of times and threatened others, to be granted its demands.
27 Freeman v. Gould Special School District, 405 F.2d 1153, 1160 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
28 Thaw v. Board of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 98 (1970). The President of the
New Jersey Association of School Attorneys, in discussing the judicial, legislative
and contractual faculty demands for a statement of reasons and a hearing for non-
reappointed, non-tenured teachers has stated:
The request for "fair play," while intended to tug at the heart strings, may in
reality be a plea for immediate tenure. Anyone who has ever tried to get rid
of a tenure employee knows what headaches are involved. I see no point in
inviting Excedrin Headache No. 251.
Evers, The Legal Rights of the Non-Tenured Teachers, 1 NOLPE SCHOOL L. J. 103,
108 (1970). Indeed, if the Roth procedures are mandatory, the average administra-
tion will avoid the headaches of not reappointing a faculty member unless there
are extreme circumstances.
29 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wisc. 1970).
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teacher to be dismissed for no reason at all or for reasons which may
be unsubstantiated. The court was convinced that once a teacher is not
rehired, he will have an arduous burden obtaining another job. The
Drown court mistakenly stated that the requirement of only giving a
statement of reasons would not impose any significant administrative bur-
den on the college3 0 The Drown procedure would ultimately necessi-
tate the establishment of a complete quasi-judicial system within a
university.
University Administrative Discretion
The non-reappointment of a teacher, admittedly, will necessitate the
same personal readjustments which an engineer, fireman, secretary, or
unskilled laborer would encounter in a similar situation. The risk of
not being hired or reappointed is one which is taken by every prospective
employee. The university, however, must be given at least the same
administrative discretion as any other body. If excellence is to be the
standard by which universities are to be judged, then they should be
given more discretion than is given to bodies governed by a lesser
standard. University administrators are chosen on the basis of their
expertise and the trust that, in the long run, their decision-making will
produce an excellent institution. Imposing upon them the burden of
issuing a statement of reasons will inhibit their discretion. Department
chairmen and appointment committees will retreat from recommending
a non-reappointment when they are told to issue a statement of reasons,
and university boards and administrators will be helpless in the face
of human nature, which dictates that human beings take the line of
least resistance. Issuing a statement of reasons by itself has the ap-
pearance of being very simple, but it will carry with it the onus of de-
fending that position before peers, hearing panels, arbitrators, commis-
sions on human rights, the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, and courts simultaneously and/or serially.
The disappointed teacher has the option of seeking employment in
a new university with the freedom to explain his departure from his
former employment in the best manner. If a statement of reasons is
issued, subsequent employers will demand to see the same. If a state-
ment is issued, it will likely contain matters which will appear as factual
statements although they are really personal judgments. A termination
resulting from a personality conflict which accounts for a poor working
relationship may contain allegations of teaching faults which result
primarily from the personality clash. A relatively blank record would,
on the other hand, be beneficial to the great majority of teachers seek-
ing new employment.
30 Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970).
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/10
Conclusion
It has been our belief throughout this article that the resolution of
these conflicting interests is not in the domain of the courts. Tradi-
tionally, it has been the duty of the legislatures, governing boards, and
colleges, with extensive experience in dealing with the appointment
process and observing its results, to make changes in the tenure system.' I
The state legislatures and universities have adopted varying tenure
systems throughout the country, which they believe best suit their
needs. In general, these systems have proved workable and have
produced many outstanding public universities. Suggestions for im-
provement in such systems should be properly addressed to and con-
sidered by these bodies. If, in their judgment, too many injustices have
resulted from not giving a statement of reasons and a hearing thereon
to non-reappointed teachers, they may then find ways to improve the
system. Where substantial constitutional rights have been impinged in
the appointment process, the courts must be and have in the past been,
prepared to protect these rights while preserving the ultimate authority
of the university to choose its faculty.
Traditionally, universities have maintained an extensive degree of
autonomy to regulate themselves and preserve academic freedom. If
the values of higher education are to be preserved, the legislatures and
courts must allow universities to discover and maintain their own ma-
chinery governing appointments, and the universities must abstain from
conduct which may invoke the anger of legislators and bring the vise of
outside control upon them. This awesome task of maintaining an at-
mosphere of autonomy will be greatly increased if universities are com-
pelled by the courts to adopt regulations governing non-tenured faculty
likely to insure their reappointment, ultimately resulting in the dilution
of the university's power to govern itself. To date, universities and
legislatures have been able to work out systems of tenure which have
proved acceptable to both. In considering the balance of interests gov-
erning procedures for the reappointment of non-tenured faculty, they
have chosen to maintain university administrative discretion. The com-
bination of a period of one-year appointments at pleasure followed by
tenure with removal thereafter only for cause has proved to be de-
fensible against objections and oppressive measures. While the current
system should frequently be examined for reforms, this should be left
to the university which must maintain a watchful eye for legislative
action prompted by the public ire against inefficiencies and inequities
within the system.
31 See brief of the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities of Illinois,
the Board of Regents of Regency Universities of Illinois, the Board of Trustees of
Southern Illinois University, the American Association of State Colleges and Uni-
versities, the American Council on Education and the Association of American Col-
leges as amici curiae on the appeal of Roth v. Board of Regents, appeal docketed,
No. 18490, 7th Cir.; see above, n. 12.
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